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ABSTRACT
Although CTS can be described as a broad church, scholars working
within this approach want to produce knowledge which can help
shape, improve, change, or replace contemporary counterterrorism.
GuidedbyMarx’smantra that thepoint of theory is not only to interpret
the world but to change it, CTS has since its inception challenged the
status quo of contemporary counterterrorism on the basis that it is
possible to conduct counterterrorism diﬀerently, more humanly, and,
put plainly, better. The concept of emancipationwas identiﬁed early on
as the foundation and basis for knowledge. However, a deeper debate
on emancipation has largely been absent since 2010. Could it be that
CTS exhausted the debate on one of its core commitments only ﬁve
years into its existence? Have we reached the end of emancipation? Or
could it be that emancipation is not that attractive at all for CTS and its
normative projects? This article beginswith a review and a state-of-the-
art discussion of emancipationwithin CTS.While it might be the end of
emancipation in its traditional conceptualisation, the article argues that
emancipation can be retained as the basis for normative theorising and
action within CTS when reconceptualised as a Weberian value-axiom.
The article concludes by exploring a transﬁguration of the concept of
emancipation itself.
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Introduction
In the introduction to the edited volume, Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda,
published in 2009, the editors argued that by the mid-2000s there was a nascent but
observable “critical turn” in the ﬁeld of terrorism studies that they wished to “stimulate,
encourage, and more clearly articulate” (Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 1).
Academically, it was noted how reviews of the terrorism literature bemoaned the generally
poor quality of much terrorism research. Empirically, the morally disturbing and counter-
productive aspects of thewar on terror provided a crucial impetus for this critical turn. At the
2018 CTS Annual Conference, hosted in Leeds, one of the leading CTS scholars, Harmonie
Toros, described the atmosphere at the time as a cry out for change. It was evident then that
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) made use of brutal and indiscriminate violence, and this
created onlymore violence. Channelling their inner Marx, the founders of CTS, I think it is fair
to say, wanted an approach to terrorism research that did not merely seek to describe the
world, but to change it. In other words, the deep dissatisfaction with the use of violence in
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contemporary counterterrorism, combined with a ﬁeld of terrorism studies dominated by
a statist bias meant there was room, and a need, for an alternative approach to the study of
terrorism. As such, CTS was born out of a real sense of urgency to challenge contemporary
counterterrorism with a strong emphasis on normative action.
Given CTS’ close connection with Critical Security Studies, and in particular the Welsh
School (henceforth CSS), the normative agenda was early on anchored in a commitment
to emancipation. Although emancipation is a contentious concept, it received only some
attention in the ﬁrst years of CTS’ existence. Indeed, since 2011 a deeper debate on
emancipation has been missing, although the debate at the time raised essential issues
for an approach to terrorism studies that wants to produce knowledge that can change
the world, not merely describe it. This, I would suggest, is in fact troubling, and it is time
to resuscitate the debate. The reasons for this are many-fold. First, it surely cannot be the
case that CTS exhausted the debate on emancipation only a few years after it was
established. That would represent an unparalleled feat regarding normative questions
and ethics in politics. Second, normative questions cannot be objectively proven, and
should be continuously and rigorously examined, questioned and debated. This is
necessary if emancipation, and indeed any other normative concept, is to be
a valuable source of normativity, and to avoid a situation in which emancipation
becomes a dead dogma. Third, normative claims are what we use to drive forth our
own arguments, to propound our own views on a speciﬁc topic. If the point of theoris-
ing is to change the world (put broadly), then not only do we need to be clear just what
exactly it is that we envision this change to entail, but this commitment also entails
acknowledging and recognising the inherent normative commitments of our interven-
tions. As such, this article begins with an overview of the debate on emancipation within
CTS, and the main points of debate. It will then move on to discuss some key conceptual
issues with emancipation and its appropriation by CTS. The article will explore how
emancipation could more fruitfully be taken out of its traditional Frankfurt School/
Horkheimerian conceptualisation, and instead reconceptualised as a Weberian value-
axiom. Finally, the article will explore a possible transﬁguration of emancipation as
a concept. It should be noted that this article is concerned with philosophical issues
regarding emancipation, and not with discussing or providing concrete examples of
emancipation in praxis. This is an important caveat insofar as much critique of emanci-
pation has centred on questions about what emancipation in praxis would look like or
entail for CTS. However, such discussions would necessarily be hampered and limited by
unresolved philosophical issues. The article will not be able to fully resolve these issues,
but it aims to advance and add to the debate on normativity in CTS.
Initial contributions
CTS was, in many ways, modelled after Welsh school CSS which meant that the concept
of emancipation would be at the heart of the new research agenda. In the ﬁrst volume
of Critical Studies on Terrorism, Ken Booth, one of the primary architects of CSS, set out to
provide navigation aids for the new approach to terrorism studies (Booth 2008).
Summarising arguments he had made previously, Booth stated that the organizing
principle for a critical theory is emancipation, which should be understood as
a process and not an end-point, that true emancipation cannot be at anybody’s expense,
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and that the means of emancipation should be consistent with the ends (ibid., 77).
Indeed, Booth noted that “emancipation is concerned with the escape from scarcity,
liberation from ignorance and lies, and freedom from political tyranny and economic
exploitation” (ibid). Although not part of the article in the journal, it is worth mentioning
that in the context of CTS, it is common to make reference to his deﬁnition of
emancipation:
As a discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppres-
sions that would stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible
with the freedom of others. It provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical
anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance
against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing
humanity. (Booth 2007, 112).
Furthermore, Booth made four propositions about emancipation in relation to the study of
terrorism which reﬂect the points made above: (1) emancipation is inextricably bound with
security, and security is conceived broadly and as a positive value; (2) there is a conceptual
harmony between emancipation and security, so that the means must be commensurate
with the ends; (3) the struggle against terrorism should be part of the struggle seeking to
emancipate humans everywhere from the oppressions of political violence; and (4) the
struggle for emancipation must be universal if it is to be successful (ibid).
These propositions can be, as the article will demonstrate, found throughout the
debate on emancipation within CTS. In particular, making emancipation the philosophi-
cal anchorage for knowledge, as well as a theory of progress, is an interesting move
which entails a speciﬁc approach to normative action. The edited volume, Critical
Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda from 2009, contained two key chapters on
emancipation which built on the Boothian approach. The ﬁrst is a chapter by Toros and
Gunning where they explore what contribution a Frankfurt School-inspired critical
theory (FSCT) approach could make to the study of terrorism (Toros and Gunning
2009, 88). Their approach draws heavily on CSS, but also adopts Booth’s pearl-ﬁshing
approach (originally an Arendtian approach) to ﬁnd pearls of ideas that might be strung
together. The pearls for this particular approach are found primarily in the works of Max
Horkheimer and Robert Cox, but this method was not without its problems, a debate we
will return to. The analysis is conducted through two moves proposed by Booth in the
context of CSS, namely, deepening and broadening terrorism research (Booth 2007;
Toros and Gunning 2009, 89). Brieﬂy summarised, the deepening move aims at uncover-
ing the ontological and ideological assumptions and interests behind terrorism studies,
while the broadening move aims to broaden the perspective from only non-state actors
to include other forms of political violence, such as state terrorism. Importantly, the
broadening move aims to analyse and account for the various social and historical
contexts within which these acts of violence take place. The central insight of the
deepening move is that theory is always from somewhere, for someone and for some
purpose (Booth 2007, 150). Research on terrorism is therefore not objective in the
positivist sense, but shaped and inﬂuenced by “our perceptions and ideological lean-
ings, by the social processes we are part of, by the particular political and economic
structures we inhabit, and the material and ideational interests that derive from them”
(Toros and Gunning 2009). The rejection of any notion of an idealised objective stance or
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approach to research on terrorism is key to the emancipatory position. The deepening
move destabilises seemingly stable categories and assumed facts, such as terrorism as
an exclusively non-state activity, or that the state is the ultimate referent to be secured.
Such assumptions, or facts, come from somewhere, and they are ontologically unstable.
The authors therefore suggest that CTS should adopt the doctrine of minimal founda-
tionalism to retain terrorism as a category of violence to be understood within
a particular socio-historical context. More speciﬁcally, “rather than collapsing the onto-
logical distinction between object and subject, it maintains it, while acknowledging that
the two shape each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic” (Toros and Gunning
2009, 92). Following the deepening move it is clear that it is impossible to retreat to an
Archimedean vantage point when investigating human activity, and from there deduce
universal laws. The beneﬁt of a minimal foundationalist approach is that the notion of
regularities, or positivist laws, in human activity can indeed be useful within deﬁned
historical limits. Toros and Gunning draw on both Horkheimer and Cox to support this
argument and a type of Critical Theory approach that “does not reject problem-solving
or traditional theory as such, but rather recognises its importance in this particular phase
of human history and incorporates it while accepting its understandings as contingent
on socio-historical context” (Toros and Gunning 2009).
A concept which enjoys an objective-like quality in the current socio-historical con-
text is the state, but a key objective of CSS and CTS has been to challenge the state as
the ultimate referent to be secured. Indeed, armed with the methodological tools
described above, the state’s naturalised position can be challenged given its temporal
nature, and replaced with human beings. While the state is not rejected a priori as
a potentially legitimate entity for providing security (ibid., 94), it should be judged on
how well it provides security for its citizens, but also in the context of humanity at large.
Thus, theory in the context of CTS is for the emancipation of human beings. This
position follows from the process of deepening described here, and combined with
a minimal foundationalist position, it forms the basis for an emancipatory, normative
framework. The inﬂuence of CSS is further strengthened when Toros and Gunning draw
on Wyn Jones, and argue that the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation.
Indeed, the possibility that emancipatory potential exists is paramount to Critical Theory,
and “it is only this possibility that gives critical theory coherence, and indeed, purpose”
(Wyn-Jones 1999, 56). As such, emancipation is tied to the development of possibilities
for a better life already immanent within the present and is not concerned with reaching
a state of emancipation, but how to realise concrete utopias. Emancipation is thus
understood as a process of emancipation for all from all forms of violence (Toros and
Gunning 2009, 100). Finally, Toros and Gunning argue that emancipation in this context
aims to transform terrorist violence through means that are compatible with the ridding
of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Importantly, emancipation demands the
recognition of a common humanity, and that we are capable of imagining a better
future (ibid.,107).
The debate on emancipation is continued in the edited volume with a chapter by
McDonald, who sets out to address the question of what a CTS research agenda deﬁned
in terms of a concern with emancipation might look like. Drawing on CSS scholarship,
and echoing points made by Toros and Gunning, McDonald focuses on the possibilities
for emancipatory change through advances in non-repressive dialogue and deliberation.
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Discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism are understood to be central to the
dynamics of this kind of political violence, and thus, it is important to focus on commu-
nicative actions, and the process of freeing up space for alternative voices to be heard
(McDonald 2009, 113). As a way of structuring the exploration of emancipation within
a CTS research agenda, McDonald suggests a series of questions which might guide it.
For example: who deﬁnes terrorism?; who deﬁnes terrorists?; and who deﬁnes the
dominant response to the “terrorist threat”? (ibid., 114). These questions could be
viewed as part of the arsenal of the “deepening” move described above, and centres
on the issue of “whose security” is prioritised. They can be seen to operate along the
dictum that “theory is always from somewhere, for someone and for some purpose”. In
this regard, the emancipatory focus is on how current spaces for dialogue are con-
structed or limited, how dominant deﬁnitions of key concepts and responses have
become dominant, and on locating silenced and marginalised articulations of terrorism
and responses to it. Importantly, as the questions build on the CSS framework, they rest
on the assumption that there are immanent possibilities for emancipatory change. As
mentioned above, emancipation in both CSS and CTS has been deﬁned as a process,
and this process works closely with the theoretical tool of immanent critique. The latter
is a “dialectical method of inquiry that engages with core commitments of particular
discourses, ideologies, or institutional arrangements on their own terms, in the process
locating possibilities for radical change within a particular existing order” (ibid., 113). For
McDonald, one emancipatory goal for CTS could be that of identifying, empowering,
and amplifying silenced voices in concrete contexts. He notes that this should be done
rather than articulating one’s own vision to be imposed externally. The main idea
conveyed here is that theorists should look for concrete utopias that can be realised,
and these might be found by identifying and amplifying marginalised voices, but also by
focusing on the ﬁssures, tensions, and inconsistencies within discourses, and institu-
tional arrangements. The obvious disjuncture between Western states’ articulated goals
of winning the war on terror, and ridding the world of evil terrorists, and how these
goals are realised through counterproductive practices can provide a basis for critique
that might change actions and policies. As such, there are immanent possibilities for
emancipatory change. Wyn Jones argued that it was only this possibility that could give
Critical Theory coherence and purpose, and McDonald’s approach is quite concrete in its
focus on discourses and how to amplify silenced and marginalised voices with promot-
ing inclusive dialogue and debate.
Critique
The appropriation of FSCT scholarship has proven be a contentious issue for CTS, and
while much of this critique is of the utmost importance to a CTS research agenda, it has
not necessarily received as much attention as could be desired. There were of course
people who critiqued CTS with varying degrees of seriousness and quality. Jones and
Smith, in their now infamous article (Jones and Smith 2009) poured scorn on CTS and its
proposed agenda, including how Ken Booth, in the article described above, assumed the
manner of an Old Testament prophet handing down commandments to his disciples. At
the more serious end of the scale, an early substantive critique of how CTS had adopted
FSCT and emancipation was presented byMichel and Richards (Michel and Richards 2009).
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In their article, they contend that, so far, there is almost a “complete absence of any
meaningful and substantial engagement with the epistemological implications of Critical
Theory and its close – but again partly problematic – relation to the normative-ethical
agenda of emancipation” (ibid., 410). This is a serious critique given the prominent role of
Horkheimerian and FSCT-inspired theory in both CSS and CTS – not least because of how
CTS has articulated a research agenda of emancipation which, as the authors correctly
argue, explicitly and consciously draws from Marxist-inspired FSCT. One of most salient
issue centres on the notions of relativism and truth, arguing that CTS has committed itself
to a historicist notion of truth which acknowledges and focuses on the contextual and
historically contingent nature of our knowledge. The concern is that, if not properly
substantiated, this position leaves itself open to a relativist position in which knowledge
claims cannot be evaluated against a common basis. Violent acts could then be legit-
imised by “claiming their rootedness in a speciﬁc historical environment that cannot be
judged by standards outside itself” (ibid., 404). This is of course a serious charge, and to
avoid a position of epistemological relativism, CTS has, as discussed above, advanced
a minimal foundationalist position. Michel and Richards argue that this position maintains
a commitment to an ontological dualism, although in a minimalistic fashion. As such, the
minimal foundationalist approach leaves open the issue that it, on the one hand, cannot
maintain that human beings can grasp “objects” for what they really are –what Kant called
das ding an sich. On the other hand, “if it maintains a nominalism that places these
concepts at the mercy of intersubjective, and therefore eventually, mind-dependent
processes, how does it escape from a relativist commitment?” (ibid., 404–405).
Subsequently, Michel and Richards connect this potential ﬂaw in the CTS research agenda
with Critical Theory’s more general struggle to pursue a notion of truth. Following Rush,
they argue that Critical Theory has utilised and reconceptualised Hegel’s teleological
account in the form of a coherence theory of truth in an attempt to maintain
a meaningful notion of truth. However, Critical Theory has rejected the teleological
element in which a speciﬁc movement will reach a pre-given end, and instead opted for
an everlasting dialectic at the heart of human existence. The material point here is that the
possibility of truth is integral to the concept of emancipation because without it, emanci-
patory projects are left without epistemic authority (ibid., 405). As such, a relevant ques-
tion in this regard is how do self-appointed emancipators know that they are
emancipating? And do emancipatory projects need a basis – a ﬁxed standard – against
which it can measure progress towards a better society or social freedom? In this regard,
there is perhaps not much help to gain from Horkheimer who pointed out that “in regard
to the essential kind of change at which the critical theory aims, there can be no
corresponding concrete perception of it until it actually comes about. If the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future” (Horkheimer 1972, 221).
What becomes clear is that minimal foundationalism leaves important issues unresolved,
and this greatly impacts emancipation as the normative basis for a research agenda. The
carry-over from the lack of substantial engagement with the philosophical aspects of Critical
Theory is evident when Michel and Richards discuss emancipation more speciﬁcally.
Emancipation, they argue, is in CTS understood as emancipatory rationality, and directed
at the individuals and groups who suﬀer from the rigid and hegemonic discourses that
dominate contemporary terrorism studies and praxis. Moreover, CTS has made the assump-
tion that not only is “universalising a speciﬁc set of values (i.e. Western) a good thing but
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that every community will ultimately, when it comes to its senses, pursue a path of
emancipation which will lead to a universalistic conception of a just society and
a harmonisation of norms and values” (ibid., 406). Although this critique seems a little too
harsh, it does raise serious issues regarding emancipation as a totalising global project. The
key point remains, namely, that “a normative aim (in this case liberating or emancipating or
simply helping the oppressed of the world” is not a viable ground on which scholarship or
action for that matter can be based’ (ibid., 408). In 2010, another major critique was brought
by Heath-Kelly who argued that CTS had appropriated emancipation without regard for the
philosophical context that made it intelligible (Heath-Kelly 2010). Similar to Michel and
Richards, she argued that if CTS is a critical endeavour which supports an emancipatory
project, it needs to fully account from where it obtains the necessary justiﬁcatory force to
assert its normative function and projects. A key problem was that CTS had fused and
utilised both Coxian and Horkheimerian Critical Theory, which could be said to have
addressed the ontological and epistemological ﬂaws of positivism and traditional theory
which follow from the dualist position. But what about the function of knowledge? In
relation to the issue discussed above, the question is how do self-appointed emancipators
justify the normative function of their knowledge claims? In Heath-Kelly’s reading, the main
reason CTS has come into problems with its appropriation of emancipation, and concomi-
tant failures to justify the normative function of its knowledge, is largely due to the “pearl-
ﬁshing” method. In the context of CTS, this method has led to slices of arguments and
devices being appropriated without regard for the whole context (Heath-Kelly 2010, 249).
For example, Coxian critical theory is attractive to CTSwith its concisemantra that “all theory
is for someone and for some purpose”, and the description of traditional theory as “problem-
solving theory”. Despite making no reference to Horkheimer, Cox argues in a Horkheimerian
manner that problem-solving theory contradicts itself because of its claim to be value-free.
Cox explicitly links problem-solving theory to politically stable historical epochs, while he
implicitly links it with support of the state. The failed objectivity of problem-solving theory
means that its proponents are, in a way, co-opted by the hegemonic system, and unable to
reﬂexively engage with the possibility of this situation. This understanding of problem-
solving theory has proven useful for CTS critiques of the orthodoxies in the ﬁeld of terrorism
studies, among which is the prioritization of the state as the primary referent to be secured.
However, Heath-Kelly argues that an instance of the naturalistic fallacy has occurred in Cox’s
theory. The term naturalistic fallacy denotes improper delineation of an “ought” from an “is”
within argumentation, and was ﬁrst advanced by Moore in his critique of utilitarianism. The
main idea is that the natural existence of something is incorrectly understood as creating
a “good”, and therefore right. In the utilitarian case, Bentham assumed that because
pleasures are what make people happy, therefore it is right to pursue pleasure. Moore
contended that this was a fallacy, and that in Ethics one cannot get from “is” to “ought” that
way (Moore 1903). When Cox equates the function and content of reason he argues that
instrumental/objective reason should be superseded by objective/critical functioning rea-
son on the basis of content-errors and contextually constituted function. Instead, reﬂexive
traditional theory is actually the response that should logically follow these problems (ibid,
247). Cox establishes a natural reality in which “problem-solving theory ‘disguises’ its
ideological identity – concealing the partisan nature of all theory – and then seamlessly
proposes that counter-hegemonic theory ought to explicitly declare its values in response”
(Heath-Kelly 2010, 247). What remain absent in Cox’s proposals are the reasons for why
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objective/critical reason is to be preferred. Horkheimer, the primary source of Critical Theory,
does not equate content and function of reason, but instead relies upon a philosophy-of-
history approach to support his normative project, emancipation and the transformation
into the right kind of society. Reality and the progression of history is understood to be
a self-unfolding whole, which is alreadymorally and developmentally progressive. History is,
for Horkheimer, the validator of ideas, and theory is correct, or perhaps true, if it is brought
with eﬀort to power (Held 1980, 191–93). In Horkheimer’s reasoning, then, using ‘a philo-
sophy-of-history, “is” (i.e. truth) can be determined via “ought” (the normative progression
of history) (Heath-Kelly 2010, 248). As such, there is immanent potential for rational
organisation as the normative foundation on which progressive groups can move society
further down the path of development. However, the philosophy-of-history approach with
its teleological character, oﬀers little evidence outside conjecture to validate itself. Held
argues that Horkheimer inadequately explains why the interest in a rational society is
universal, and why critical theory is the correct theoretical expression of this interest (Held
1980, 248). In a similar vein, one could ask why emancipation is the correct normative
expression or goal of theory, and indeed, the goal for research on terrorism. Thus, when
Heath-Kelly argues that CTS has shown “no signs of recognizing the presence of
a philosophy-of-history approach, and utilises Horkheimerian theory, alongside its Coxian
foundations, in a Coxian manner- possibly exposing itself to the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ charge”
(Heath-Kelly 2010, 248), this is a serious critique. In an attempt to highlight the ontological
and epistemological ﬂaws in traditional terrorism studies, CTS has relied on Critical Theory as
the source for its normative agenda. The consequence is that CTS is unable to provide
suﬃcient normative force to sustain an emancipatory agenda because ‘there is simply no
way of proving by logical argumentation that objective theory is better than instrumental
theory, as the grounds onwhich tomake the judgement are unavailable (ibid, 246). As such,
Heath-Kelly suggests that for CTS to retain its normative function it would have to (1)
describe the existence of contemporary human suﬀering; (2) delineate why such suﬀering is
bad, and why it necessitates counter-action; and (3) legitimate itself within the academic
terrain by exposing the non-objectivity and contextual constitution of the traditional
academic project, and introduce its own legitimacy which stems from the conceptualisation
of the emancipatory project as a solution to the suﬀering in the world (ibid, 252). If CTS were
to explicitly justify its moral cause to prevent avoidable human suﬀering with normative
arguments, it could then utilise and make reference to Critical Theory to legitimate the
presence of this moral agenda within academia. In other words, the rejection of traditional
terrorism studies as “instrumental” would be logically sound, and anchored in a separate
and explicitly stated moral cause. Then it delineates a way in which the perspectival
knowledge produced by CTS scholars could be anchored in an explicitly stated moral
cause, or value-orientation. The ﬁnal contribution to the debate on emancipation that
I have chosen to include here is made by Joseph (Joseph 2011). He continues the line of
philosophical critique of the appropriation of critical theory arguing that CTS has made little
eﬀort to engage with critical theory, and instead relies on many ideas of the post-positivist
turn in IR. Crucially, this philosophical confusion has resulted in CTS taking an overly
discursive approach which fails to properly engage with terrorism as a social relation.
There are a great many important aspects of this article but I will focus one speciﬁc
discussion because it relates to the discussion on minimal foundationalism, and the later
discussion in this article regarding Weber’s arguments about values. Joseph points out that
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adopting aminimal foundationalist approach is important as it allows for an extra-discursive
reality in which it is possible to move from ﬁrst to second-order critique. Thus, while there
are no ultimate grounds for believing that our statements are true, this is due to “the mind-
independent nature of reality rather than the endless play of signiﬁcation within discourse”
(ibid., 26). This is a material point because this mind-independent reality provides the basis
for assessing knowledge claims and allows us to “combine epistemic relativism with
ontological realism and therefore judgmental rationalism” (ibid.). The latter concept allows
us to judge competing theoretical claims on the basis on their explanatory adequacy. The
existence of a mind-independent world allows for the possibility to produce knowledge
about the world, but this knowledge is a social product and the mind-independent world
cannot be understood and studied in a positivist fashion. As such, we might say that while
we all have diﬀerent perspectives on the world, there has to be a shared reality on which we
have those perspectives. This is perhaps what CTS has tried to achieve by adopting
a minimal foundationalist approach, and indeed, Toros and Gunning use this as a basis on
which to distance the CTS research agenda from post-structuralism. They suggest in the
chapter discussed above that Horkheimerian Critical Theory does not “reject the notions of
‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists would call laws) or the usefulness of the
positivist approach in establishing these” (Toros and Gunning 2009, 92). The key here is that,
following a minimal foundationalist approach, regularities may be observed but within
particular eras and within deﬁned historical limits. Toros and Gunning contend that this
approach could serve as a bridge between critical and traditional scholarship. However,
Joseph argues that they are wrong to suggest a compromise with positivism because the
latter confuses the knowledge we produce as scientiﬁc laws, and “these laws are deﬁned
according to the methods that search for empirical regularities, the consequence is that
positivist science adopts a ﬂat ontology that takes the world as it appears to us, rather than
considering its underlying reality” (ibid., 26). The proposed bridge between traditional and
critical theory might therefore be a poorly engineered construction based on a shaky
foundation. As such, a common element in the critique of the appropriation of emancipa-
tion has focused on the lack of substantial engagement with the philosophical context of
Critical Theory and emancipation. This has resulted in what Joseph labels an overgener-
alised notion of emancipation (ibid, 30), and Michel and Richards argues that emancipation
“is used without any substantial clariﬁcation as to its conceptual and practical content”
(Michel and Richards 2009, 407). Thus, it is perhaps a little disappointing that in the CTS
textbook, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, published in 2011, the authors did not address
the critique of the appropriation of emancipation. Although such a discussion was perhaps
not within the remit of an introductory textbook, for our purpose it is still worth noting that
a broad commitment to the concept of emancipation was highlighted and maintained
(Jackson et al. 2011, 41).
The end of emancipation?
Despite considerable criticism on a key issue for a CTS research agenda, the debate
on emancipation quietened down after 2011. This is not to say that every issue in the
journal should have an article on emancipation, but the lack of discussion is some-
what surprising given the ramiﬁcations of the critique on an articulated core commit-
ment of the research agenda. In fact, it was not until the publication of the CTS
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handbook in 2016 that emancipation received more attention. In a chapter on ethics
and emancipation, Toros argues that traditional terrorism studies have homogenized
a great many diﬀerent groups under the single category of terrorist groups, and that
“this homogenization leads to a dangerous disconnect between the analysis of the
violence and the context of each conﬂict. [. . .] Terrorism is understood as
a dysfunction in the social order rather than as a symptom of a dysfunctional social
order” (Toros 2016a, 72). This is an important distinction, and right in line with
a Critical Theory approach. From here Toros argues, in familiar CSS and CTS terms,
that critical theory-based scholars need to be reﬂexive about how they can under-
stand the social world and engage with it. Again, the proposed notion of emancipa-
tion rests on the minimal foundationalist position, meaning there is a world out there,
but that we can only access it from within our social, political, economic and
historical context. As such, terrorism can be said to exist as a category of violence
which is comprised of both the material acts of terrorist violence, and the social
construction and reconstruction in competing discourses (ibid., 74). Addressing the
ever-present concern of how to operationalise emancipation, Toros suggests that it
could be understood as emancipation from both terrorist and counterterrorist vio-
lence. It could also entail supporting nonviolent responses to conﬂicts marked by
terrorist violence, such as dialogue and negotiations, as well as studying the contexts
of terrorist violence to identify those nonviolent voices which are subjugated or
silenced. Importantly, she argues that all actors are capable of using and working
towards both emancipatory and counter-emancipatory means and ends. This is a key
debate because it pertains to the possibility of what elements of the state are open
to and engaging in emancipatory means and ends. Toros and Jackson added to this
debate in 2016 about whether an emancipatory agenda is commensurate with the
ambition and goal to be policy relevant. Jackson voiced considerable doubt about
whether this is possible, noting that under contemporary conditions “it is virtually
impossible to maintain an ethical commitment to human rights, human welfare, non-
violence, and progressive politics – that is, emancipation – while simultaneously
participating in an inherently violent and counter-emancipatory regime of counter-
terrorism” (R. Jackson 2016, 122). Yet, CTS has been quick to adopt Marx’ urge to
change the world, and not just interpret it. At base, there must be a belief that
emancipatory change is possible. This is at the heart of Toros’ response to Jackson in
the same volume. While she agrees with Jackson’s assessment about the state of
global counterterrorism, she disagrees about how to engage with states to change it,
arguing that:
the global counter-terrorism regime run by states is ‘deeply anti-emancipatory, anti- human,
and regressive’ and certainly does not ﬁt the deﬁnition of emancipation adopted by CTS,
but this does not exclude states and state actors from having ﬁssures or internal contra-
dictions through which we can foster and promote change. (Toros 2016b, 127).
Both Jackson and Toros make valid points regarding the discussion on emancipation,
although I am personally sympathetic to Toros’ approach. Evaluating the CTS critique of
counterterrorism in 2016, I argued that CTS should explore its reconstructive potential
(Lindahl 2016). There was no shortage of de-constructive work and critique, but com-
paratively little in terms of concrete alternatives. For many of the same reasons as set
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forth by Toros, I argued that emancipation should be at the centre of the research
agenda, and that states are not excluded as potential locations or drivers for emanci-
patory policies and actions. Working from this foundation, I attempted to construct
a model of counterterrorism based on CTS scholarship to explore the reconstructive
potential, and use this model to analyse Norway’s approach to counterterrorism (Lindahl
2017, 2018). The initial analysis showed that Norway did engage in actions and policies,
such as negotiations and conﬂict resolution, which could be described as having
emancipatory potential. The purpose was not to establish Norway as an emancipatory
actor, but the analysis did identify and locate emancipatory potential within one state’s
approach to counterterrorism.
Where from here?
As the above review showed, CTS received serious criticism for its appropriation of
critical theory and emancipation, and ten years on these criticisms have not been
addressed or inspired a second substantial debate on emancipation. This is surprising
and somewhat disappointing, given its status as a core commitment and as one of the
features that is supposed to set CTS apart from traditional research on terrorism – not
least because it goes to the core of what CTS is, and what it should be. CTS has, from its
inception, been described as a broad church that welcomes scholars engaging with
terrorism through a range of methodologies and theories. At the same time, the
founders placed great emphasis on emancipation, understood in a Horkheimerian fash-
ion, as the guiding concept for normative action. The above review would seem to
indicate that this is the fundamental tension which is not yet resolved or addressed
adequately. As it stands, emancipation as the source for normative action is drying up. In
this regard, one could ask whether emancipation is really needed for CTS as a broad
church. An argument can be made that deconstructing, analysing and discussing con-
temporary theories, discourse and praxis might be considered critical activities in
themselves. As such, emancipation might hinder or serve as an obstacle to such
activities and processes. Stump and Dixit have, for example, argued for a critical
approach to studying terrorism which is not centred on emancipation (Stump and
Dixit 2013, 6), and it is not surprising that scholars might be unwilling to embrace
emancipation and the FSCT-tradition which it traditionally is part of. Connecting knowl-
edge production with a teleological account of truth is a potentially dangerous philo-
sophical move which can help legitimise a range of nefarious policies and practices in
the name of emancipating subjects.
However, in this regard it might be useful to recall critical theory’s overall argument that
knowledge production is never a neutral undertaking. Two important strands of critical
theory, namely Gramsci’s argument that all those with the social function as intellectuals fall
into two groups, traditional and organic (Gramsci 1971, 5–23), and Horkheimer’s critique of
the role of traditional theory (Horkheimer 1972), illustrate the importance of this argument.
Continuing this line of reasoning, a strong case can be made that scholars should recognise
the inherent normative commitments of their interventions.
Indeed, the inescapable consequence of dismissing the positivist approach of produ-
cing value-free and objective knowledge about politics, and terrorism more speciﬁcally,
is that scholars base their research on speciﬁc value-judgements, whether or not this is
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explicitly and rigorously spelled out (Jackson 2008, 147). The inherent normative com-
mitments should therefore be acknowledged, and this article argues that a broad (re-)
conceptualisation of emancipation could actually encompass these commitments. Thus,
emancipation does not become a dogma or normative straight-jacket that limits critical
research. Wyn-Jones once argued that, “without the ability to claim that a better world is
possible or even conceivable, there is no means by which the present can be criticized”
(Wyn-Jones 1999, 56). He suggested that this is the reason why many poststructuralist-
inspired writers imply notions of emancipation, and one could argue that even when
CTS is understood as a broad church, it is the concept of emancipation that gives critical
approaches to terrorism their purchase on that reality. As such, while CTS should not be
reduced to just a speciﬁc emancipatory research agenda, it seems to me clear that there
are solid reasons for why emancipation is essential to a research agenda which, at its
core, is centred on non-violent normative action. Coming back to the very reasons that
motivated a group of scholars to establish CTS, and echoing Wyn-Jones’ argument for
why emancipation should be at the centre of critical theory, I should like to put forth the
argument that normative action is what gives CTS coherence, and indeed, purpose. The
following paragraphs will therefore explore a possible reconceptualisation of emancipa-
tion to address the philosophical concerns discussed in this article.
A Weberian approach to emancipation
The argument admittedly advocates that CTS broadly should embrace and explicitly
endorse emancipation, and the remainder of the article will focus on a possible recon-
ceptualisation, or even a transﬁguration of emancipation. The following paragraphs will
explore how a diﬀerent approach to emancipation could be of great use in producing
methodologically sound and critical knowledge, but more importantly, perhaps, how
emancipation provides a guideline for normative action.
The exploration starts with a discussion of Weberian scholarship, and although Max
Weber has not occupied a prominent role in IR scholarship, and unsurprisingly nor in
CTS, his scholarship could be of great value and utility for a CTS research agenda.
Preceding the Constructivist turn in IR by several decades, Weber’s ontological and
epistemological positions are close to the contemporary social constructivist position
in which knowledge is understood as a social product. Weber contends that humans are
cultural beings with the will and capacity to take a deliberate attitude towards the world
and lend it signiﬁcance. Based on the Methodenstreit of his day, Weber dismisses the
positivist approach of gathering presuppositionless facts to explain social events, and
labels such an approach absurd. Instead, he advocates a philosophically monist position
when he argues that the category of facts, from which knowledge is constructed and
produced, is the meaning social actors bestow on their actions. Furthermore, he deﬁned
sociology as a science that concerns itself with the interpretive understanding of social
action, and that “we shall speak of ‘action’ insofar as the acting individual attaches
a subjective meaning to his behaviour” (Weber 1968, 4). Human action, and the asso-
ciated bestowal of meaning, form the horizon within which the facts for social analysis
take place. Moreover, human action takes place in a great many diﬀerent contexts, and
to apprehend and analyse this concrete reality is a diﬃcult task. Weber notes that
attempts to investigate the ways in which life confronts us in immediate concrete
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situations represent “an inﬁnite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging
and disappearing events” (Weber 1949, 72). Moreover, this multiplicity remains undi-
minished, even when we turn and ﬁx our attention on a single object of study. This
position holds that any aspect of reality cannot be apprehended without presupposi-
tions, that is, without assuming a certain point of view. Weber therefore turned his
attention to the presuppositions that are necessary conditions of investigations and
research on social issues. Talking about the chaos that deﬁnes the inﬁnite multiplicity of
social reality, Weber argues that “order is brought into this chaos only on the condition
that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and signiﬁcant to us,
because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality” (ibid, 78).
As such, Weber argues that we cannot apprehend reality in its totality. Instead, all
knowledge is abstraction from the concreteness of reality, which means that knowing
anything or any aspect of this inﬁnite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emer-
ging and disappearing events, necessarily involves abstracting particular elements. Thus,
no knowledge is possible without conceptualisation, because “concepts are the means by
which abstraction from the concreteness of reality is eﬀected” (Hekman 1983, 20). The
question then becomes how an investigator chooses a particular segment of facts as topic
for investigation, or as worthy of being known.
To answer that question, Weber is insistent on the importance of personal value-
judgements, arguing that “without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no
principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of concrete
reality” (Weber 1949, 82). Furthermore: “all the analysis of inﬁnite reality which the ﬁnite
human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a ﬁnite portion of the
reality constitutes the object of scientiﬁc investigation, and that only it is ‘important’ in
the sense of being ‘worthy of being known’” (ibid., 72). This describes, I would argue,
rather accurately the critique set forth by CTS of traditional terrorism studies insofar as
the latter is seen to present its research as formed by presuppositionless facts, and that
what they deem worthy of being known is presented as objectively true. In comparison,
Weber argues convincingly that investigators select a ﬁnite portion of a complex and
inﬁnite reality as the object of study based on speciﬁc value-judgements. That naturally
implies that as researchers, we prioritize certain aspects of this reality and base our
inquiry on speciﬁc value-judgements, whether or not we are explicit and rigorous about
spelling them out (Jackson 2008, 147).
Weber uses the term value-judgements to denote the “practical evaluations of the unsa-
tisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our inﬂuence” (Weber 2011, 1). He
argues that no scientiﬁc procedure, be it rational or empirical, can provide a decision in
matters of conﬂicts between several conﬂicting ends. Philosophical disciplines, however, can
lay bare the “meaning” of evaluations, and indicate their place within the totality of all the
possible evaluations, and delimit their spheres of meaningful validity (ibid.,18–19). Because
the data and areas of interest in the social sciences are selected by value-relevance of the
phenomena in question, a discussion of value-judgements is necessary and should be
considered as integral to social scientiﬁc inquiries. Such a discussion can have three functions:
ﬁrst, an elaboration and explication of the ultimate and internally consistent value
axioms; second, a deduction of implications which follow from the irreducible value -
axioms, when the practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these axioms; and
third, the determination of the factual consequences which the realisation of a certain
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practical evaluation must have (a) in consequence of being bound to certain indispensable
means; and (b), in consequence of the inevitability of certain, not directly desired repercussion
(ibid., 20–21). For our purposes, this process can be useful as a way of reﬂexively engaging
with “emancipation” as the ultimate, internally consistent value-axiom in a research agenda.
This discussion addresses a key critique discussed above that the idea self-reﬂexivity ironically
has been missing from CTS scholarship (Joseph 2011; Michel and Richards 2009). As Heath-
Kelly showed, Critical Theory in itself cannot generate suﬃcient normative force to assert its
normative claims and function, and emancipation would have to be, to some extent, recon-
ceptualised to form the normative principle on which to launch projects to realise concrete
utopias. Thus, Heath-Kelly could give an example of how emancipation was not internally
consistent within the CTS research agenda. Following Weber, emancipation could simply be
understood as the ultimate value-axiom, which cannot be proven by any rational or empirical
inquiry. While thismay seem like amove towards relativism, it is nothing of the sort. Themajor
illusion and fallacy of traditional theory is that it tries to validate its explicit, or non-explicit,
value-axioms through empirical science. Instead, following Heath-Kelly’s suggestions, it is
possible to describe the existence of contemporary human suﬀering as a consequence of
contemporary counterterrorism, explain why it is bad based on the notion of the individual as
the primary referent to be secured (and that we cannot enjoy true security when it comes at
the cost of another’s security) to evoke emotive force which legitimates our approach in the
academic terrain. Not only does it avoid the problems of traditional theory in terms of the
content of knowledge, but the function of knowledge is justiﬁed and connected to the value-
axiom which lends coherency to the overall theory. We can then turn to the implications
which follow from the irreducible value-axiom of emancipation, when the practical evaluation
of factual situations is based on this axiom. The major implication is that all theory of social
and cultural life is understood to be political. As such, we may borrow from Cox’s excellent
terminology and conﬁdently state that all theory is for someone and for a purpose. It would,
however, not try to legitimise normative arguments through ought-is argumentation by
establishing emancipation as the “truth” or the best universal expression of the normative
interest. Emancipation as the moral cause would be about preventing avoidable human
suﬀering, and it can onlymake claims to how research, actions, and policies should be enacted
based on this axiom. Like an ideal-type, it can describe and make the case for what could
happen, but also what should happen. It seems to me there is a diﬀerence here between
emancipation as the value-axiom connected with ideal-types of knowledge, and emancipa-
tion as the normative foundation based on a minimal foundationalist approach. The point of
discussion is whether the minimal foundationalist approach still establishes certain categories
like terrorism and emancipation as “truths”, only within a deﬁned context which itself is an
ideal-type.
To develop this discussion a little more, Michel and Richards argued that minimal
foundationalism maintains a commitment to an ontological dualism, although in
a minimalistic fashion. As such, it rejects the possibility of knowing “objects” for what
they really are, but simultaneously maintains a nominalism that places these concepts at
the mercy of intersubjective, and therefore eventually, mind-dependent processes.
Similarly, Joseph, on his side, was concerned that CTS saw minimal foundationalism as
a potential bridge between traditional and critical scholarship, but this approach would
ignore the important philosophical diﬀerences between the critical and traditional
scholarship. This concern is further highlighted by Weber’s insight that
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the quality of an event as “social-economic” event is not something which is possesses
“objectively”. It is rather conditioned by the orientation of our cognitive interest, as it arises
from the speciﬁc cultural signiﬁcance which we attribute to the particular event in a given
case. (Weber 1949, 64).
Thus, when minimal foundationalism is used to posit that objective regularities within
socio-historical epochs exist, this existence rests on the subjective notion of what con-
stitutes a socio-historic event or era. As such, utilising a minimal foundationalist approach
might bring about the paradox that, on the one hand, it is possible to critique positivist
attempts to approximate the objective “truth” of terrorism, or neglecting values by
assuming the existence of presuppositionless facts. On the other hand, it attempts to
approximate the “truth” but now within a subjectively-deﬁned speciﬁc context. Given the
philosophical context of Critical Theory, it is not surprising that the quest for some notion
of truth is inherent to minimal foundationalism and emancipation. Without due consid-
eration, however, this move might just resemble a more reﬁned dualistic and positivist
stance. This postulation of truth might be what is making scholars sceptical or hesitant to
embrace emancipation. As such, this is a tension that CTS needs to engage with in a more
substantial manner if it is focus on normative action and change.
Truth and relativism
The Weberian approach also addresses and overlaps with the key issues discussed in this
article. Joseph argued that minimal foundationalism allows for the existence of a mind-
independent reality which provides the basis for assessing knowledge claims and opens
up for the ability to combine epistemic relativism with ontological realism and therefore
judgmental rationalism. As mentioned above, Weber begins from a practical standpoint
stating that, “the type of social science we are interested in is an empirical science of
concrete reality” (Weber 1949, 72). Out of this concrete reality we select certain facts and
deem aspects of this reality as worthy of being known. As such, Weber holds a position
which is similar to minimal foundationalism, but this foundation is not for seeking the
“truth” or progressing society towards a more rationally organised society. It simply
means that knowledge is a social product, and our values are integral in this process. It
seems to me that Weber conducts the kind of judgemental rationalism which Joseph
highlights because in Weber’s conception there is no apprehendable “world”, externally
existing objects, that could be used to limit the application of an idea-type or to falsify
and improve it. Instead, Weber notes that we
must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of
increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully,
are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as
our are to us. (Weber 1949, 57).
Thus, empirical research cannot serve to validate a particular way of constructing the
world though value-judgements. This, however, does not mean knowledge claims
collapse into intersubjective meanings so that they are only valid for one person and
not others. Instead, he argues that even someone who rejects our values should be able
to appreciate the results of the analysis by applying those values to a particular empiri-
cal problem, or reality. Moreover,
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the successful logical analysis of the content of an ideal and its ultimate axioms and the
discovery of the consequences which arise from pursuing it, logically and practically, must
also be valid for the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese can “lacks a sense for our
ethical” imperative and he can certainly often deny the ideal itself and the concrete value-
judgements derived from it. Neither of these two latter attitudes can aﬀect the scientiﬁc
analysis in any way. (ibid., 58–59).
The Chinese, to Weber, represents someone with diﬀerent value-orientations than our
own, and he should appreciate the results others produce by applying those to the
study of empirical reality. As Jackson notes, the essence of this framework is that it is on
the basis of a more or less technical question of application, and not on the content or
character of the value-orientations thus applied, that the scientiﬁc character of an
investigation can and should be valuated (Jackson 2008, 148). In this regard, Weber
argues that concepts, abstractions and knowledge claims should be evaluated according
to their heuristic and expository qualities, which is similar to Joseph’s argument for
judgemental rationalism. This is the basis on which CTS can, and indeed have critiqued,
traditional terrorism studies on the content of knowledge.
When it comes to normative questions, or the ideals that move us most forcefully, it is
questionable whether emancipation can ever be what CTS wants it to be, as long as it
remains underdeveloped. This concern derives from the philosophical roots of emanci-
pation, in particular the Horkheimerian position in which it is tied to rationally creating
a better society. Not only, as Held argued, did Horkheimer fail to show why the interest
in a rational society is universal, and why critical theory is the correct theoretical
expression of this interest (Held 1980, 248), but after reading Eclipse of Reason, in
which Horkheimer complained about the loss of objective reason and simultaneously
made an appeal for objective truth, Marcuse in a letter to Horkheimer hoped he could
expound of the many trains of thoughts in the book:
Especially the one which disturbs me most of all: that the form of reason which suddenly
changes into complete manipulation and domination still nevertheless remains a form of
reason, so that the real horror of the system lies more in its rationality than in its
irrationality. That is easily said – but you must still provide the development for the actual
reader- no one else can or will do so, (Marcuse in Wiggershaus 1995, 350).
Concluding remarks
The above discussion has delineated how emancipation in its initial Critical Theory
context was understood as part of the eﬀort of progressive groups to move society
further down its path of development towards rational organisation. However, given the
problematic relationship between minimal foundationalism and claims to normative
truth, it seems to me that instead of thinking about emancipation as a truth, a more
fruitful approach could be to think of “true” in a manner closer to its meaning of “being
true to”. Critchley describes this as an act of ﬁdelity which is kept alive in the German
word treu (Critchley 2012, 3), or even the Norwegian word tro. The idea then is that
emancipation is a normative commitment we try to remain true to, instead of emanci-
pation as an end-point. CSS and CTS have adopted a similar position, insofar as
emancipation is understood to be a process and not an end-point. However, given the
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unresolved philosophical issues, this normative commitment still remains liable to the
critique oﬀered by Michel and Richards that CTS makes an assumption that every
community would want to pursue a path of emancipation, which will “lead to
a universalistic conception of a just society and a harmonisation of norms and values”
(Michel and Richards 2009, 406). If the normative aim is to provide space for emancipa-
tory rationality (Blakeley 2007, 234; Jackson 2007, 249–50), then the emancipatory
process would still be heading towards a concrete end-point. The various eﬀorts to
realise concrete utopias would be to reach a situation in which space for emancipatory
rationality is the normative end-point.
These concerns notwithstanding, it seems to me that emancipation remains valuable
as a value-axiom in research, insofar as our own values are part of the production of
knowledge, whether we acknowledge it or not. Furthermore, in praxis emancipation
could be understood as a guideline for normative action – what Benjamin calls
a Richtschnur des Handelns (Benjamin 1996). This guideline for action is an approxima-
tion rather than a decree or commandment to be followed once and for all.
Emancipation, therefore, is not, to paraphrase Critchley, “an a priori moral law from
which we derive a posteriori consequences” (Critchley 2012, 220). Instead, we often ﬁnd
ourselves in real, concrete socio-political situations of violence, and emancipation is
a guideline for action. Booth placed great emphasis on the means/end relationship and
non-violence in his conceptualisation of emancipation, and Jackson more recently made
the point, on which I agree, that nonviolence is central to the notion of emancipation
(Jackson 2017). Indeed, the principle of means/ends consistency is clear that the means
we use have to be commensurate with the ends we want to achieve. Not only is this
a strong theoretical and moral argument, it is also supported empirically by the blatant
failures of the GWOT. Emancipation and non-violence are two sides of the same coin,
and faced with concrete situations of violence, such as the contemporary war on terror,
what we have “is a plumb line of nonviolence, of life’s sacredness” (Critchley 2012, 220).
In this understanding, emancipation is not an end-point, or the means to reach the
reach or establish the correct normative truth. It is, in some ways, similar to Jesus’s
ethical demand (love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you [Matt. 5:44])
in the sense that this demand is extreme and ridiculous. Critchley points out that Jesus’s
demand puts the ethical subject in a situation of sheer ethical overload, and that “what
such a demand does is expose our imperfection and failure and we wrestle with the
force of the demand and the facts of the situation” (Critchley 2012, 221). Indeed, it is
diﬃcult to think of emancipation as a kind of Kantian moral law or the correct normative
expression of theory, and even in its current various articulations, one could argue that it
places the subject in situation of sheer ethical overload. Perhaps this is one reason why it
has proven so diﬃcult to identify and point to concrete examples of emancipatory
policies and actions. However, if we think of all theory as being political, then one could
argue that politics, and emancipation, is “action that situates itself in the conﬂict
between a commitment to nonviolence and the historical reality of violence into
which one is inserted, and which requires an ever-compromised, ever-imperfect action
that is guided by an inﬁnite ethical demand” (ibid., 243). Thus, emancipation could be
understood in relation to an inﬁnite ethical demand that exceeds the ﬁnitude of any
context, but simultaneously is not permitted to programme political action in which
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speciﬁc decisions are deduced from incontestable moral precepts. As such, emancipa-
tion must to some degree be universal, but not tied to notions of truth or the correct
rational progression of society. This marks a shift from the Horkheimerian understanding
of emancipation, and clariﬁes the argument about emancipation as a process. It is not
about emancipating others, or driving society down the path towards a more rationally
organised society. As a continuous process, emancipation is an inﬁnite ethical demand
which lays bare two key consequences for research and praxis. First, to follow the plumb
line of emancipation (means/ends consistency and nonviolence), and second; to accept
responsibility for choosing not to follow it.
In a complex and often chaotic reality we are faced with concrete situations of
violence and counter-violence, and there no transcendental guarantees. Dewey argued
that human activity is continuous, and ‘nothing happens which is ﬁnal in the sense that
it is not part of any ongoing stream of events.‘[. . .] (and) “ends are, in fact, literally
endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new
consequences”(Dewey 1922, 232). As such, what we have is an inﬁnite ethical demand
and a plumb line of nonviolence. If emancipation is about realising concrete utopias,
I would argue that this process is best approached by being true to emancipation. Our
research, actions and policy suggestions will never be completely emancipatory, but we
must struggle to remain true to emancipation as a normative commitment. Reducing
the use of military violence to counter terrorism, and not using drones to kill indiscrimi-
nately in the war on terror would be two ways in which Western countries could work to
be true to the principle of emancipation. It would not be about imposing a totalising
normative project, but about conducting research, and implementing actions and
policies that struggles to meet an inﬁnite ethical demand.
While not a ﬁnished product, it seems to me that emancipation could be of great
value outside of its traditional FSCT context and understanding. There might be other,
and better ways, of conceptualising emancipation or guiding normative action. The
primary aim of this article has been to inspire a debate on what position emancipation
should have within CTS, if any at all. It has been argued that normative action is what
gives CTS coherence and purpose, and while CTS may remain a broad church that
welcomes scholars engaging with terrorism through a range of methodologies and
theories, a broad (re-)conceptualisation of emancipation is possible which could encom-
pass the inherent normative interventions of scholars working towards social change,
and a more humane and non-violent counterterrorism paradigm.
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